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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in finding deeds, absolute in fonn, the tenns of 
which were not ambiguous, were in fact mortgages, when the Court failed to recognize 
and apply the complete, substantive legal standards? 
2. Whether the District Court erred in finding the transaction between the parties to 
be an equitable mortgage without considering whether plaintiff had standing, or whether 
the action was barred by laches and estoppel? 
3. Whether Appellant is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a)? 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal by Defendant, N.E.M. Richards from an Order of the District 
Court finding two deeds, absolute in form, the terms of which were not ambiguous, to be 
an equitable mortgage. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On September 28,2010, Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, filed a Complaint to Quiet 
Title to Real Property against Defendant, N.E.M. Richards. Mr. Steuerer alleged in his 
complaint that deeds executed and delivered by him to N .E.M. Richards, relating to 
certain real property located within the City of Shoshone, were intended not to be 
absolute transfers, but rather to be mortgages. Mr. Steuerer requested judgment quieting 
title to himself; declaring the deeds to be mortgages, and for the Court to determine the 
indebtedness owed by himself to Defendant Richards. (R. Vol. I, pp. 26-31) 
On November 5, 2010, Defendant, by Timothy Stover, Attorney at Law, filed an 
Answer admitting Plaintiff executed and delivered deeds absolute on their face, denying 
the deeds were intended as mortgages and propounding a host of affirmative defenses. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 35-38) The Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository indicates the filing fee 
for said answer was paid for by Robert E. Williams, attorney for Plaintiff. (R. Vol. I, p. 
20) The Court entered its Scheduling Order on January 18, 2011, setting the matter for 
trial on July 13,2011, wherein all pre-trial motions were ordered to be filled no less than 
ninety (90) days before trial. (R. Vol. I, p. 46-53) Defendant Richards submitted to 
deposition on March 14, 2011, represented by Attorney Stover. Attorney Stover 
withdrew as counsel for Defendant, on March 15, 2011. (R. Vol. I, pp. 64-65) 
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Attorney, Allison E. Brace, thereafter, on April 1, 2011, entered her appearance 
on behalf of Defendant Richards. (R. Vol. I, p. 68) Richards, represented by Brace, 
responded to written discovery requests on April 29, 2011, which was followed by 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, set for hearing on June 21, 2011. Attorney 
Brace, nor Attorney Stover conducted any form of discovery on behalf of Defendant. No 
response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was prepared or filed by Attorney 
Brace. (R. Vol. I, pp. 20-25) 
On June 16, 2011, present counsel filed a Notice of Appearance, Motion to 
Continue and Reset Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Trial 
Setting. On June 20, 2011 counsel filed a Motion for Leave to File Late Response to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motionfor Summary Judgment, Affidavit ofNE.M Richards in Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to Shorten Time, and a Notice of Hearing, setting 
the foregoing for argument the following day. On June 21, 2011 the Court denied all 
pending motions, but amended its Scheduling Order to allow deposition of Plaintiff prior 
to trial. (R. Vol. I, pp. 22-23) 
The issues were tried to the Court on July 13,2011. The only witnesses to testify 
were Plaintiff, Donald E. Steuerer, Defendant N.E.M. Richards and Donn Bordewyk, the 
General Manager of the Valley Co-Ops, Incorporated. Documentary Evidence offered 
was admitted by stipulation of the parties. In addition to those exhibits included on the 
parties' Exhibit Lists, Defendant offered original check registers, original check stubs, 
and a copy of check written by Defendant Richards to Plaintiff. (Tr. Vol. I) Post-trial 
briefing was submitted, prior to the Court issuing its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
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Law and Order, awarding Plaintiff the relief sought. Attorney fees were requested, but 
denied pursuant to the procedure allowed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Timely 
Notice of Appeal followed. (R. Vol. I, pp. 24 & 400-410) 
Statement of Facts 
This Statement of facts is based upon the District's Court's Summary of 
Testimony and Exhibits, and Findings of Fact, included in its Order. (R. Vol. II, pp. 370-
396) Appellant does assert the District Court's findings were clearly erroneous, but only 
in relation to whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Appellant 
takes no issue with the court's findings of fact, except where specifically called out 
herein, with more specific references to the Clerk's Record and Transcript on Appeal. 
Summary of Testimony and Exhibits 
Donald Steuerer is the plaintiff herein. According to his testimony, he is a 67 
year old resident of the City of Shoshone, Idaho since 1990. Steuerer resides at 110 
North Greenwood, the subject property. Plaintiff purchased the subject property from the 
Old Fellas on a "hand shake" in December 1987 for the sum of $3,000.00, which was 
paid in installments over a period of approximately seven (7) months. At the time of 
purchase the plaintiff was a resident of the State of New York. Plaintiff, for a period of 
time, worked on Wall Street as a trader. He has not worked since 1996 and last filed tax 
returns in 1996. In 2003 he began receiving SSI disability benefits. He received those 
benefits until the year 2007 when he began receiving Social Security Benefits of 
approximately $800.00 per month. He has had no other source of income. 
The plaintiff became acquainted with the defendant, N.E.M. Richards, in 1990. 
She was residing at 115 North Greenwood in the City of Shoshone. Her residence is 
3 
across the street from the subject property. Between 1990 and 1997 they would visit a 
few times per week. He considered her a friend. In the summer of 1997 he had a 
conversation with Ms. Richards at her residence as to what he intended to do with the 
subject property and he indicated he intended to develop the property into a 
bar/restaurant. She inquired as to how much he would need to accomplish his plan and 
he indicated he would need $2,000.00 to $5,000.00. He denied at the time of this 
discussion there was any mention of delinquent property taxes. He testified Ms. Richards 
offered to loan him $5,000.00 for development of a bar/restaurant. He offered to put her 
name on his deed if she loaned him the money and he intended the deed as collateral for 
her loan. However, Steuerer testified at the time of signing the deed he believed Richards 
owned Y2 of the property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 64) He did testify he had offered to make her a 
partner in the bar/restaurant but she declined. There was no discussion between the 
parties as to the date or time for repayment, except that he would pay it back when the 
"bar got opened." As for the loan, he denies he ever received the sum of $5,000.00 and 
testified he only received the sum of $2,000.00, in the form of four (4) consecutive 
checks of $500.00. He executed a Warranty Deed [Exhibit 101] as the collateral for the 
loan and placed Ms. Richards' name on the deed on February 25, 1997. He testified Ms. 
Richards told him that she did not have any other money to loan him. 
After he received the $2,000.00 from Ms. Richards he did not have much contact 
with her between 1997 and 2000 because she was in and out of the hospital. He testified 
that he only saw her a few times a month. Sometime in the year 2000, Ms. Richards 
came to his residence and they discussed his delinquent property taxes. She offered to 
catch him up on the property taxes for three years if he would deed all of the subject 
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property to her as collateral. Concerning this loan, regarding the property taxes, she said 
"pay me back when you can." Regarding these loans there was never any discussion 
about interest to be paid on the loans. He executed a Quit claim Deed [Exhibit 1 02] to 
Ms. Richards on May 8, 2000. 
After the year 2000, he did not see Ms. Richards again until either 2003 or 2004 
when he was at the V A Hospital in Boise for medical treatment. Ms. Richards was also 
at the hospital for medical care. He testified he told Ms. Richards he was receiving SSI 
benefits and could start repaying the loan and she responded he should call her to discuss 
repayment. He testified he attempted to call her and write to her but his mail was 
returned undeliverable and his calls were not returned. When he would call the phone 
was either busy, she did not answer, or the voice mail was full. It was not until March 
2007 that he was able to speak with Ms. Richards concerning the repayment of the loan. 
This was after Valley Co-op expressed an interest to him in purchasing the subject 
property. He drove out to a ranch where she was staying and met her near some corrals. 
He told her he might have an opportunity to sell the subject property and wanted to know 
what he owed her on the loan. He offered to pay her interest on what he owed but she 
said, "just pay me what you owe me." He admits that after the year 2000 Ms. Richards 
paid all the property taxes, except for the June 2011 taxes, which he paid. Sometime in 
May 2007 he and Ms. Richards had dinner in Twin Falls and he wanted to talk about 
repayment of the loan. He testified Ms. Richards was "in too much of a hurry" to talk 
about it. About three weeks later he says he tried to call her and discovered she was in 
the hospital. He says he followed up with letters but they were again returned 
undeliverable. 
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He did not have any opinion as to the value of his property in 1997, other than he 
assumed it was worth more than what he had paid for it. He testified that Valley-Co-op 
has offered him $110,000.00 for the subject property. 
On cross examination, he was confronted with a pnor affidavit, wherein he 
testified that in 1997 he was destitute. He admitted he does not know what that term 
means. Today the roof of the building on the subject property is not sound and the 
interior of the building is open to the elements. The exterior of the building has not been 
painted since he has owned it. He did not pay the property taxes on the subject property 
for the period of 1995 to 1997. He does recall the months in 1997 that he received the 
four (4) consecutive check of $500.00. He only had a checking account at First Security 
Bank, at the time. He no longer has any bank records for the relevant period of time in 
question. He denies he ever told Ms. Richards he was delinquent on his property taxes in 
1997. However, in his affidavit on file with the court, he asserted under oath he was 
destitute and "that he needed money to pay real property taxes and other personal 
expenses." He did not state the loan was for a bar/restaurant. His affidavit also states 
Ms. Richards agreed to loan him "$2,000.00" not the $5,000.00 referred to on his direct 
examination. He admits he did not use any of the $2,000.00 to pay his property taxes, 
although he claims to have used the money to "fix up" the building. He admits at no time 
has he ever attempted to pay back the loan by sending payments to Ms. Richards, write a 
check, or actually tender any funds. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 77-84) His explanation is he did not 
know where to send a payment, since her mail was undeliverable. The Shoshone Club 
was the name of his intended bar/restaurant. The plaintiff is also known as "Brooklyn 
Don." 
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Donn Bordewyk is the General Manager of the Valley Co-op, which is a fann 
supply cooperative. He reports to the Board of Directors of the Co-op and oversees day-
to-day operations, as well as the long-tenn objectives of the Co-op. He has been the 
general manager since 1996. He is familiar with the subject property which consists of 
two city lots in Shoshone. The Co-op owns a C-Store and a gas station that are adjacent 
to the subject property. The Co-op' s property was refurbished in 1998 at a cost of $1.9 
million. Since the remodel, the Co-op has acquired other property adjacent to its 
property; one consisting of three city lots, purchased in 2006 for $140,000.00, and the 
other consisting of four city lots, purchased in 2007 for $180,000.00. The Co-op is also 
interested in purchasing the subject property and approached Mr. Steuerer in 2007. At 
that time, the Co-op thought he was the titled owner of the subject property. He first met 
with Mr. Steuerer in his office in Jerome. At some point in early 2010, after this meeting 
and after he became aware of the quitclaim deed to Ms. Richards [Exhibit 102], he 
contacted plaintiff s counsel to begin the process of purchasing the subject property. He 
had a conversation with Mr. Steuerer as to why his name was not on the title to the 
subject property. Mr. Steuerer told him he had borrowed money from Ms. Richards for 
expenses related to opening a business. He testified he had attempted to contact Ms. 
Richards sometime in 2008 or 2009 by telephone, but he was not able to reach her; on 
each occasion her voice mail was full and he could not leave a message. [The record 
actually reveals that Bordewyk testified he was able to leave messages and on occasion 
the voice mail was full. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 98)] He does recall talking to her on the telephone 
in April 2012. Ms. Richards' told him that she would get back to him about the 
transaction. When he did not hear back from her he tried to call her several more times. 
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It was not until December 2010 he had any substantial conversation with her. He 
testified Ms. Richards told him the amounts Steuerer owed were a loan for a business and 
they talked about the amount owed. This was the first time he had heard there was an 
additional $5,000.00 owed. They also discussed a fair interest rate. On cross-
examination, Mr. Bordewyck admitted Attorney Williams works for him. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
101) 
N .E.M. Richards is a resident of the City of Shoshone, Idaho and has resided, for 
over 20 years, at 115 North Greenwood, located across the street from the subject 
property. She currently suffers from various physical and mental disabilities and has 
been treated for such disabilities at the V A Hospital since approximately 1998. These 
disabilities have an impact on her ability to recall and organize her thoughts. She grew 
up in Hansford, Washington and went to school in the State of Washington. She went to 
nursing school at the University of Washington, but her education was interrupted by 
service in the military during the Vietnam War. After the war she returned to school at 
Washington State University and obtained a doctorate degree in veterinary medicine. 
She has never been licensed in any State to practice veterinary medicine, but has worked 
in a number of veterinary clinics, including the Shoshone Veterinary Clinic. She moved 
to Shoshone in 1987. She purchased her current residence in 1990 and it was at this time 
she first met Mr. Steuerer. They would visit from time to time and she, on occasion, 
would feed him; allow him to borrow water; and allow him to shower at her residence. 
In approximately 1995 or 1996, Mr. Steuerer approached her and told her he was 
behind on his property taxes. She thought his house was close to foreclosure based on his 
delinquent taxes. She gave him $2,000.00, which she thought he was going to use to pay 
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his back taxes. She did not want to see him living on the streets. She does not recall if 
she gave him the money in cash or by way of a check. She testified there was a verbal 
agreement he would pay her back "as soon as possible." "I didn't think it would be right 
away. 1 thought that it would take him sometime, because I thought he should do the 
taxes. 1 told him don't worry about it." By February 1997, Mr. Steuerer had not paid 
back the money. She had not made any demand for payment, because "I don't believe in 
pressing people for money." In February 1997, she talked to someone else who had lent 
money to Mr. Steuerer and Mr. Steuerer had given this person some guns as "collateral." 
At this time she thought Mr. Steuerer's property was worth about $6,000.00, so she asked 
him for half of his property as an "incentive to pay me back." She asked him for a 
document saying half of his property was hers and he gave her the Warranty Deed 
[Exhibit 101]. She believed she was a half owner of the subject property after receipt of 
the Warranty Deed. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 113-14) 
She does not recall if, between 1997 and 2000, she and Mr. Steuerer had any 
conversations about repayment of the $2,000.00 loan. She does recall going to dinner 
with Mr. Steuerer in Twin Falls. She testified she was hoping to talk about repayment 
but it was Mr. Steuerer who did not want to discuss the subject. She admits this dinner 
was sometime after the year 2000. She did testify that sometime in 1997 Mr. Steuerer 
approached her and indicated he was in need of more money because he was still behind 
on his property taxes. She agreed to give him $5,000.00, over time, in increments. She 
told him "if he signed over the whole thing [referring to the subject property] ... I would 
catch up on everything and pay taxes [referring to the property taxes]." She claims to 
have given him a series of checks totaling $5,000.00 over a ten month period. At the 
9 
time of trial, she belatedly, provided Exhibits 212 [original check stubs including check 
#1807 dated 2/25/1997 payable to Donald E.K. SteuererlShoshone Club for $400.00; 
check #1809 dated 3/3/1997 payable to Steuerer for $100.00; check #1812 dated 
5/1/1997 payable to Steuerer for $500.00], 213 [original Washington Mutual check 
register listing check #425 dated 6/1/1997 payable to Steuerer in the amount of $500.00], 
214 [Washington Mutual cancelled check to Don Steuerer #415 for $500.00 dated 
61111997 and check #511 dated 7/1/1997 payable to Shoshone Club in the amount of 
$500.00]. 215 [original partial check register]. 
The deposition of Ms. Richards was taken on March 14, 2011 and admitted into 
evidence at trial. As to the money she paid Mr. Steuerer, she testified, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
[Pg. 13, L. 5-12] 
Q: .... When was the first time you agreed to loan money to Mr. Steuerer? 
A: In the late 1990's. 
Q: And what was the reason that you agreed to loan him money? 
A: I didn't want him to be on the streets. And he was delinquent in his taxes, so that 
I could keep the house - he could keep the house from foreclosure. 
[Pg., L. 5-12] 
Q: SO did you make a loan to him the late 1990's? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And how much was it for? 
A: 2,000. 
Q: How did you pay him the money that was loaned to him? 
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A: I don't remember. 
[Pg. 16, L. 15-21] 
Q: And what do you say the agreement that you made together, you and Mr. 
Steuerer, as to how you would be repaid the loan? 
A; He - I - he indicated he would pay me back as soon as possible. And I told him 
not to worry; I would not charge him rent, just to imagine it was his. So there was no 
definite time period to pay back. 
[Pg. 17, Line 2-8] 
Q: Did you agree on a time by which the loan had to be repaid? 
A: As soon as possible. 
Q: After you made Mr. Steuerer this $2,000.00 loan, did you ever ask him for the 
money to be paid back to you? 
A: No. 
[Pg. 25, L. 1-9] 
Q: SO he deeded you a half interest in the property for the $2,000.00? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And did you consider yourself the owner of the property at that time? 
A: No. 
Q: SO what was the arrangement, why didn't you -
A: Part Owner. 
[Pg. 25, L.17 to Pg. 26, L.12] 
Q: Why didn't you take possession of it if you had a half-ownership interest in it? 
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A: Because I made an agreement with Brooklyn Don that he could just live there and 
pay me back. 
Q: SO without trying to put words in your mouth, Ms. Richards, this is more like a 
mortgage then, you had basically an interest in the property, and when he paid you back, 
you would deed your interest in the property back to him, was that the intent? 
A: The intent was to have some kind of collateral. 
Q: SO you viewed your half interest in the property that was acquired by this deed as 
collateral? Was there some other kind of collateral, other than this deed? 
A: No. 
Q: SO let's just say, what would you have done then, let's say in the year 1998, had 
he paid you back the $2,000.00? 
A: I would have signed it back over to him, as I told him I would. 
[Pg. 26, L.23 to Pg. 29, L.8] 
Q: Between 1997 and the date of the Deposition Exhibit No.2, at least the last page 
of the Deposition Exhibit No.2, which the document says is May 3rd, 2000, -- maybe 
May 8th , 2000, it appears. Did you make any more loans to Mr. Steuerer over and above 
the $2,000.00 you've already told me about? 
A: Yes. 
Q: How much did you loan him and when did you loan it to him? 
A: 5,000. And I'm not sure when. It was not all at one time. 
Q: Do you remember when any part of the $5,000.00 was loaned to Mr. Steuerer? 
A: Not at this time. Late 1990's. 
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Q: Was it before the date that's on the that deed that we're looking at, the last page of 
Exhibit 3? 
A: Yes. 
Q: It would have been before May 8t\ 2000? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And why did you loan the additional money to him? 
A: I don't remember what reason he gave me. 
Q: But, in any event, your testimony is that you did advance him an extra $5,000 
sometime between February of 1997 and May of 1998? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was there any new agreement reached between the two of you at time as to how 
the new loan amount, which appears to now be up to about $7,000, would be paid? 
A: No. 
Q: Was it-
A: Not except for as soon as possible. 
Q: Still as soon as possible? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And there still was no specific date mentioned? 
A: No. 
Q: After May 8, 1998, if Mr. Steuerer would have paid you back the $7,000, what 
would you have done? 
A: Signed it back over to him. 
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Q: Now, could you tell me, looking at the last page of Deposition Exhibit No.3, 
again, which is the Quitclaim Deed dated May 8, 2000, why was this second deed signed 
and give to you at the time? 
A: Because of the loan. The extra loan. 
Q: The new-
A: That's why I'm sure he-
Q: The new $5,000 loan? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Was it supposed to be again, collateral, like the warranty deed was to be collateral 
from the initial $2,000 loan? 
A: It was something to assure me that he was going to pay me back. 
Q: After May 8, 2000, did you ever take possession of the real property that's 
described in the quitclaim deed and the warranty deed? 
A. No. It was the same agreement, live there free. 
Q: Has that agreement-
A: Consider it your own. 
District Court Findings of Fact 
Steuerer purchased the subject property in December of 1987 for the sum of 
$3,000.00. The subject property has a two story structure on it and the property consists 
of two city lost. Richards lives at 115 North Greenwood which is across the street from 
the subject property. Steuerer became a fulltime resident of the City of Shoshone in 
1990. Richards purchased her current residence in 1990. In 1990 Richards and Steuerer 
became acquainted as friends. 
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Steuerer was capable of paying his property taxes on the subject property from the 
time he purchased it up until approximately 1995. The evidence is unclear as to 
Steuerer's income for those years. Steuerer has not filed any income tax returns since 
1996. Between 1995 and 1996 his gross income was not more than $8,000.00 from part-
time work. From 1995 forward, Steuerer did not pay his property taxes. 
Richards, from time to time, would help Steuerer by feeding him, providing him 
with water, and allowing him to shower at her residence. At some point in time, Richards 
and Steuerer had discussions regarding the subject property. The testimony of the parties 
is in conflict as to when these discussions took place and as to the content of those 
discussions. According to Richards, these discussions first took place sometime between 
1995 and 1996. According to Steuerer, these discussions first took place in 1997. As to 
the content of the discussion, according to Richards, they concerned Steuerer's 
delinquent property taxes and according to Steuerer the discussions concerned his desire 
to develop his property into a bar/restaurant, to be known as the Shoshone Club. 
Richards denies any discussion of the idea of a bar/restaurant Steuerer denies any 
discussion of delinquent property taxes. What is not in dispute is these discussions 
concerned Steuerer's need for money and Richard's willingness to assist Steuerer 
financially. It was clear to the court the current recollection of the parties, in their 
testimony, are not necessarily reliable 15 years later. This case is a classic example of 
why friends and handshakes do not always work. 
There is no dispute that, at some point in time, Richards agreed to loan money to 
Steuerer and did in fact loan money to Steuerer. There is a conflict in the testimony of 
the parties as to when the money was loaned and how much money was loaned. 
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According to Richards, in 1995 or 1996 she initially paid Steuerer the sum of $2,000.00; 
however, she does not know if the money was paid in cash or by check. Further, 
Richards testified she loaned an additional $5,000.00 to Steuerer sometime in 1997, 
which was paid in monthly payments over a period of ten (l0) months. According to the 
testimony of Steuerer, he only received the sum of $2,000.00 in 1997, which was paid to 
him in the form of four (4) checks, each in the sum of $500.00 over four (4) consecutive 
months. From the notations on the original check stubs [Exhibit 212], it would appear 
Richards originally agreed to loan $5,000.00 in February 1997. 
The Court found no reliable evidence, either through the testimony of the parties 
or the documentary evidence, that Richards loaned any money to Steuerer in 1995 or 
1996. Plaintiff asserts the testimony of Richards on this point is un-contradicted, and her 
demeanor credible, while Steuerer was discredited on a host of statements. The 
documentary evidence [Exhibits #212-215] absolutely verifies Richards issued six (6) 
monthly consecutive checks totaling $2,500.00 to Steuerer. The documentary evidence 
on this topic proves Steuerer's testimony that he only received four (4) monthly, 
consecutive checks for $2,000.00 is inaccurate. The evidence verifies that Steuerer was 
paid, at least $2,500.00, as follows: 
Check # Date Paid Amount Paid 
1807 
1809 
495 
1812 
425 
2/25/1997 
3/03/1997 
4/0111997 
5/0111997 
6/0111997 
$400.00 
$100.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
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511 7/0111997 $500.00 
The documentary evidence [Exhibit 212] also supports the finding that Richards 
agreed to loan to Steuerer the sum of $5,000.00 in February 1997; by reason of the 
notations she made on her check stubs #1807, 1809 and 1812. On each of these check 
stubs there is a notation written by Richards at the time the check was issued. The 
notation for check #1807 is "$5,000-Balalnce 4600"; the notation for check #1809 is 
"Balance for March 1 sl $4500"; and the notation for check # 1812 is "May Balance 
$3,500." This is consistent when one considers the April 1, 1997 check, issued to 
Steuerer for $500.00, check #495, which was written from a different account. It is clear 
that, for a period of time, Richard was tracking how much of the original $5,000.00 had 
been paid to Steuerer. The court examined Exhibit 213, the original check register of 
Richards, which appears to cover the period of 4/9/96 to 10128/98, and concluded during 
this entire period there were only two checks written from this account; check #495, 
dated 411/97 for $500 payable to Steuerer, and check #511, dated July 1, 1997, for $500, 
written to the Shoshone Club. The court also found the first check Richards wrote [check 
#1807] made reference to both Steuerer and the Shoshone Club. 
It appeared to the Court from the testimony of Richards and Steuerer that their 
recollections of the events are not necessarily reliable, as to the amounts loaned and 
when. The court found the testimony that Richards loaned $2,000 to Steuerer in 1995 or 
1996 is not reliable and that the testimony of Steuerer that he only received four (4) 
consecutive checks of $500.00 each is not reliable. In February 1997 Richards agreed to 
loan $5,000.00 to Steuerer to be paid to Steuerer in monthly payments. Based on the 
documentary evidence, and disregarding the testimony of Richards, the amount paid by 
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Richards to Steuerer over six (6) months totaled $2,500.00. Richards was only able to 
find records that support the six (6) payments to Steuerer, but has not retained or 
provided to the court documentary evidence of any other payments to Steuerer. The 
Court found the testimony of Steuerer and Richards as to the number of payments made 
is not reliable and the best evidence is the documentary evidence that has been admitted. 
The court found of the agreed $5,000.00, Richards paid $2,500.00 to Steuerer. 
The first payment by Richards to Steuerer, verified by documentary evidence was 
on February 25, 1997. A Warranty Deed dated February 24, 1997, was prepared, 
whereby Steuerer conveyed to Richards a one-half interest in the subject property. The 
deed was notarized and recorded on February 26, 1997. The deed was signed by both 
Steuerer and Richards. Steuerer testified that the purpose of the deed was to be collateral 
for the $5,000 loan from Richards. Richards testified in her deposition the purpose of the 
deed "was to have some type of collateral." Ms. Richards believed herself to be part 
owner as a result of the deed and having paid Steuerer $2,000. (R. Vol. II, pp. 378-379) 
Both parties were of the expectation and agreement the amounts paid to Steuerer 
by Richards would be repaid by Steuerer and, upon repayment, Richards would re-
convey her interest in the subject property to Steuerer. The parties did not agree as to a 
definite time for repayment, other than to agree Steuerer would repay the monies as soon 
as possible, or when he could. Richards, prior to the filing of the lawsuit, has never made 
demand for repayment. There was no agreement as to any interest to be paid and it was 
not a topic of discussion in the original agreement. 
Prior to June 20, 2011, the last time Steuerer personally paid any real property 
taxes on the subject property was on April 2, 1997, in the amount of $20l.58 [Exhibit 
18 
107]. This was for the 1994 property taxes, which were delinquent and the payment was 
inclusive of the tax, interest, and penalties owed to Lincoln County. In May 2000, 
Steuerer was delinquent in the payment of his property taxes on the subject property for 
the prior years of 1995 to 1999. Richards brought the property taxes current by her 
payments to Lincoln County dated May 8, 2000 and December 20, 2000. [Exhibits 108-
112]. 
On May 8, 2000, the same day Richards paid part of the delinquent property taxes 
on the subject property, Steuerer executed a Quitclaim Deed to the subject property, 
wherein he conveyed his remaining interest in the subject property to Richards. The deed 
was notarized and recorded on May 8, 2000. As with the Warranty Deed, the Quitclaim 
Deed was signed by both Steuerer and Richards. The testimony of Steuerer and Richards 
is again in conflict as to the reason for the quitclaim deed; however, what is clear is that it 
was executed contemporaneously with Richards' agreement to pay the property taxes on 
the subject property. Richards testified the purpose of the quitclaim deed was the same as 
the warranty deed, as collateral or "something to assure me that he was going to pay me 
back." As a result of the second deed Ms. Richards believed she owned the subject 
property. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 131-136) Richards had agreed to, and would have, re-conveyed 
the subject property to Steuerer if repaid. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 131-135; R. Vol. II, pp. 380-
381) 
Between May 8, 2000 and December 20, 2000, Richards paid all of the property 
taxes, including any interest and penalties, in the sum of $6,784.91. 
At all times relevant, between 1997 and 2010, Steuerer continued to occupy the 
subject property and was not paying any rent to Richards; nor had Richards demanded the 
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payment of rent. Mr. Steuerer never tendered up any money to Ms. Richards. (Tr. vol. I, 
p. 141) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
The threshold question, as in any appeal, is whether this Court has jurisdiction of 
the parties and subject matter. Idaho Appellate Rule II(a)(1) provides the basis for 
jurisdiction of this Court. The Rule follows the Idaho Constitution, Article 5, Section 9, 
which states in part, "[t]he Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, 
any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof." In that the District Court, 
Honorable Judge John K. Butler presiding, on September 6, 2011, and September 8, 
2011, respectively, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and 
Judgment thereon, the Supreme Court clearly has jurisdiction. Notice of Appeal, file 
stamped by the Clerk of the District Court on October 12,2011, was timely filed within 
forty two (42) days of the final order of the District Court, thus perfecting the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There can be no question, that where one asserts that a deed shall be given a 
different construction from that clearly appearing on its face, the burden is upon him to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale with a right to 
repurchase, was intended. Credit Bureau of Preson v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 216, 440 
P.2d 145, 149 (1968) Equally certain, is that the determination of what is clear and 
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convincing evidence is primarily for the trial court, and is not generally open to review in 
the appellate court. Id. [see also Gem-Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Small, 90 Idaho 354, 363, 
411 P.2d 943, 948 (1966)] A trial Court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal 
unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 
549,553, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho 2006) 
Recent decisions of this Court make it plain that a heightened burden of proof at 
trial does not alter the usual standard of appellate review. When a trial court finds facts 
that must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the question on appeal 
remains whether the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Kreiensieck v. Cook, 701 P.2d 277, 280, 108 Idaho 657 (Idaho App. 1985) 
However, this Court exercises free review over the lower court's conclusions of 
law to determine whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the 
legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found. Electrical Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. 
v. Nielson, 41 P.3d 242, 136 Idaho 814 (Idaho 2001). Likewise, this Court has free 
review to determine the applicability of a presumption as a question of law. In re SRBA 
Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 256, 912 P.2d 614,624 (1995). 
In the case before this Court the District Court may have properly recognized the 
correct burden to be overcome by Plaintiff, but it failed to recognize all the legal 
presumptions and applicable substantive criteria in reaching its decision. Therefore, 
Appellant does not argue the findings of fact are clearly erroneous, but instead argues the 
District Court's conclusions oflaw are not sustained by the facts found. 
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III. 
DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE PROPER PRESUMPTIONS AND 
APPLY COMPLETE SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL STANDARDS 
Fee-simple Conveyance Presumption 
The District Court did not recognize, or ignored the presumption that a fee-simple 
title is presumed to pass by a grant of real property, and, independent of proof, the 
presumption arises that the instrument is what it purports on its face to be, an absolute 
conveyance of land. Gray v. Fraser, 123 P.2d 711, 63 Idaho 552 (Idaho 1942). The 
Court in Gray clearly annunciated the presumption that a fee-simple title is presumed to 
pass by a deed of conveyance of real property. To justify a trial court in determining that 
a deed which purports to convey land absolutely in fee simple was intended to be 
something different, as a mortgage, the authorities are uniform to the point that the 
evidence must be clear, satisfactory and convincing, and that it must appear to the court 
beyond reasonable controversy that it was the intention of the parties that the deed should 
be a mortgage. Gray, at 559, citing Beckman v. Waters, 161 Cal. 581, 119 P. 922, 
quoting (incompletely) from Couts v. Winston, 153 Cal. 686, 96 P. 357. 
The District Court did not recognize I.C. 55-606 the legislature'S declaration of 
the conclusiveness of conveyances of land. The law presumes the holder of title to 
property is the owner thereof. Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328 at 331,824 P.2d 903 (Idaho 
App. 1992); Hawe v. Hawe, 89 Idaho 367,406 P.2d 106 (1965); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 
Idaho 44, 324 P.2d 380 (1958). The District Court simply ignored this critical 
presumption in leaping to its conclusion. 
This presumption is built into the most basic statement of law in this field, "It is 
well-settled rule of law that where one asserts that a deed shall be given a different 
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construction from that clearly appearing on its face, claiming that it is a mortgage, he 
must show be clear and convincing evidence that a mortgage, and not a sale with the 
right to repurchase was intended." Hogg, at 1091-92 (emphasis added). Yet the 
District Court did not once in its Order even reference the presumption. How can it be 
said that, beyond a reasonable controversy, a mortgage was intended, when neither party 
seemed even to know what the term "mortgage" means? 
Conveyance / Agreement to Re-Convey Upon Payment 
The District Court did not apply the correct and complete substantive law to the 
facts of this case. The District Court quoted from the 1937 opinion in Jaussaud v. 
Samuels, 58 Idaho 191, 71 P.2d 426, 431, stating, "It is well settled law of this state that a 
deed, absolute in form, the terms of which are not ambiguous may constitute a 
mortgage." While the preceding is undoubtedly true, the District Court omitted from its 
recitation of the substantive law included the Jaussaud Court's next declaration. "It is also 
settled law that a mortgagor subsequent to executing the mortgage may sell his equity of 
redemption to the mortgagee; that is, a mortgagee may legally take a deed transferring the 
mortgaged property in satisfaction of the debt and legally give an option to purchase 
back." id at 202, quoting Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90. This 
rule was recently reitereated in Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho 
2006), where the Court restated the old rule announced in Parks v. Mulledy, 49 Idaho 
546,551,290 P. 205,207 (1930), that a person may purchase lands, and at the same time 
contract to re-convey them for a certain sum, without the intention of either party that the 
transaction should in effect be a mortgage. 
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Thus, the District Court clearly did not recognize and consider the competing 
principle of substantive law, in fact the legally presumed state of affairs, in its analysis. 
Superior to the principle of law the District Court did recognize, that deeds may be 
recognized as mortgages upon the proper showing, is the presumption" ... that a party can 
make a purchase of lands, either in satisfaction of a precedent debt or for a consideration 
then paid, and may at the same time contract to reconvey the land upon the payment of a 
certain sum, without any intention on the part of either party that the transaction should 
be in effect a mortgage." Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355,399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965) 
Dickens Criteria I Modern Controlling Test 
The District Court correctly cited Dickens v. Heston, 53 Idaho 91, 21 P .2d 905, 
90 A.L.R. 944 (1933), as the historically leading case on the subject at issue. The 
Dickens case continues to be relied upon as supplying the general criteria to be applied in 
determining whether a deed, absolute upon its face, is in fact a mortgage; namely, (a) 
existence of debt to be secured; (b) satisfaction or survival of the debt; (c) previous 
negotiations of parties; (d) inadequacy of price; (e) financial condition of grantor; and (f) 
intention of parties. 
Survival of Debt 
However, the District Court failed to state that under current law, the controlling 
test to be applied is whether the grantor sustains the relation of the debtor to the grantee 
after the execution of the instrument. Credit Bureau of Preson v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 
216,440 P.2d 145, 149 (1968). The Court in Sleight stated, "While all these factors are 
to be considered, the controlling test to be applied is whether the grantor sustains the 
relation of debtor to the grantee after the execution of the instrument, Clinton v Utah 
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Constr. Co., 40 Idaho 659, 237 P. 427 (1925). A mortgage is an incident of the debt, and 
without a debt there can be no mortgage. Hawe v. Hawe, 89 Idaho 367, 406 P.2d 106 
(1965); Shaner v. Rathdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (1916)." Sleight at 216. 
Whether a debt was to be secured is at best unclear on the facts before the court, 
certainly if a debt it was, it has not been repaid. No exact amount, nor date of repayment, 
was established by clear agreement of the parties. According to Ms. Richards she agreed 
to give Steuerer, first two thousand dollars ($2,000) and later five thousand dollars 
($5,000), if she were paid back as soon as possible. Ms. Richards testified Steuerer failed 
to make any effort at repayment and therefore accepted first a one half (1/2) interest in 
the property by Warranty Deed, and when the second sum of money had not been repaid, 
she accepted a Quitclaim Deed transferring full ownership to her. While she did testify 
she would have re-conveyed the property upon repayment, repayment never came. 
The obvious factual difficulty with the case is lack of written agreement, and of 
course it is this difficulty that gives rise to the Statute of Frauds. (I.C. Section 9-503) If a 
debt in fact survived, how would Richards have executed upon the debt? By foreclosure? 
By suit on oral contract? Before a deed can be declared to be an equitable mortgage there 
must exist a debt which must be personal in its nature and enforceable against the person 
independent of the security. Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 
(Idaho 1916) Idaho Code Section 5-217 requires an action on an oral contract to be 
brought within four (4) years. If such an action is not brought within the required period 
of time, it is forever barred. Therefore, a complete defense exists as to any action 
brought for the debt, and Plaintiff cannot satisfy this criteria; the controlling test under 
the law. 
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Concurrent Intention of Parties to Create Mortgage 
The District Court stated, on page 21 of its order, "Where an instrument in writing 
in the form of a deed of conveyance is executed and delivered as security for a debt, such 
instrument becomes a mortgage, and not a deed, notwithstanding the form of the 
instrument," quoting Bergen v. Johnson, 21 Idaho 619, 123 P. 484, 484 (1912) This 
"rule" is quoted from the Bergen Court syllabus, not the opinion proper, and is an 
incomplete statement of law, even from 1912. The state of the law then as now required 
a finding that the concurrent intention of both parties at the time of the transaction, was to 
create a mortgage. Bergen at 626. 
The District Court appears to have applied the overruled proposition of law that 
when at the time of execution of an absolute conveyance, a separate agreement to re-
convey is also entered into the transaction will constitute a mortgage. The Court stated, 
"The fact that the grantee retains in his possession without cancellation the written 
evidence of a debt raises a strong presumption that the conveyance given did not 
extinguish the debt, and that a mortgage was intended." (R. Vol. II, p. 390) This is a 
curious statement, in that no written agreement, but an oral agreement to re-convey, was 
entered, nevertheless, it is the Court's utterance. This rule of law has been explicitly 
overruled. Clontz v. Fortner, 88 Idaho 355, at 362,399 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1965) 
The rule above stated is too narrow .... It fails to incorporate other 
necessary and controlling elements, and eliminates the question of 
intention of the parties, and encroaches upon their right to contract. In 
effect, literally speaking, this portion of the opinion holds that a deed, in 
form an absolute conveyance, expressing the intention of the parties, 
coupled with possession, payment of taxes, assertion of ownership, and 
with a positive understanding by the grantee that he had an absolute 
conveyance and his positive refusal to accept anything but an absolute 
conveyance, cannot be upheld as such, if at the time of the execution of 
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the deed an agreement was entered into to reconvey the property. Such a 
holding is contrary to the great weight of authority, and not in harmony 
with prior and recent decisions of this court. 
Whether a deed, absolute on its face is to be deemed a mortgage depends upon the 
intention of the parties in regard to it at the time of its execution. "In order to convert a 
deed absolute in its terms into a mortgage, it is necessary that the understanding and 
intention of both parties grantee as well as grantor, to that effect should be 
concurrent and the same." Clontz, 88 Idaho 355 at 362,399 P.2d 949 at 952. (emphasis 
added) 
The District Court failed to even acknowledge the requirement that "intention of 
the parties" referenced in Dickens criteria be a mutual intention, not the unilateral 
intention of just one party. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 130 P.3d 1087 (Idaho 
2006) The District Court is required to consider the understanding and intention of both 
parties to the transaction, grantees as well as grantors. Bergen v. Johnson, 21 Idaho 
619,626, 123 P. 484, 487 (1912) (emphasis added). 
Here, both parties, in fact recognized this transaction for what it was, a grant of 
ownership, with an agreement to re-convey. The parties indeed used alternating, 
contradictory terms, collateral versus transfer of ownership or "turned over", but never 
both simultaneously, at the time of the transaction, "mortgage." Certainly, this is not a 
concurrent, mutual, agreement the transaction was intended to be a mortgage. 
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IV. 
COURT DECLARED EQUITABLE MORTGAGE WITHOUT ANY 
CONSIDERATION OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPALS OF LACHES AND 
ESTOPPEL 
Plaintiff, Steuerer, came to the Idaho judiciary seeking to have the courts declare 
the transaction of the parties an equitable mortgage. "In attempting to have a deed 
declared a mortgage, equity requires the party so asking to tender and offer to pay the 
amount of the debt and interest before he is entitled to any standing in a court of equity. 
Shaner v. Ratgdrum State Bank, 29 Idaho 576, 161 P. 90 (Idaho 1916) citing (Hicks v. 
Hicks (Tex. Civ.), 26 S.W. 227; Dawson v. Overmyer, 141 Ind. 438, 40 N.E. 1065; 
Rodriguez v. Haynes, 76 Tex. 225, 13 S.W. 296; Jones on Mortgages, 2d ed., par. 1095.) 
When seeking equity one must approach the court with clean hands deserving 
equity. This principle, and estoppel by laches, were explored by the Court in Clontz v. 
Fortner at 363. Here, like in Clontz, no evidence exists that plaintiff even spoke to 
defendant about the transaction for years and years. Like in Clontz, the defendant 
expressed public displays of ownership of the property, (payment of taxes) while plaintiff 
sat silent. The Clontz court found the Plaintiff to be estopped from claiming the deed, 
absolute on its face, to be a mere mortgage. The Court, at page 364 cited a California 
case, Hamud v. Hawthorne, 52 Ca1.2d 78, 338 P.2d 387 (1959), at some length, quoted 
below, 
It was not until plaintiffs learned of the interest of an oil company in the 
subject property that they bestirred themselves to ascertain whether such 
property was worth an effort on their part to reclaim it. As commented in 
Livermore v. Beal (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 535, 549, 64 P.2d 987, 'one is not 
permitted to stand by while another develops property in which he claims 
an interest, and then if the property proves valuable, assert a claim thereto, 
and if it does not prove valuable, be willing [399 P.2d 954] that the losses 
incurred * * * be borne by the opposite party. This thought was expressed 
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in one case by the following language: 'If the property proves good, I want 
it; if it is valueless, you keep it." (See also Robison v. Hanley (1955), 136 
Cal.App.2d 820, 824-825[1-2], 289 P.2d 560.' 338 P.2d at 392. 
The following statement from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 59, p. 105, IS 
applicable here: 
'A party who has the right to treat a deed absolute on its face as a mortgage 
and to redeem from it must be reasonably prompt in asserting such right; 
very long delay, amounting to laches on his part, may defeat his right to 
have the deed declared to be a mortgage and his right of redemption, 
especially if interests of third persons have intervened, or if the grantee has 
been allowed to deal with the property in such manner that a redemption 
would seriously prejudice him, and one conclusively chargeable with full 
knowledge of his rights will not be permitted to excuse his delay in 
seeking relief on the ground of ignorance of his rights.' 
And the following from 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 107, pp. 547-548: 
'The term 'quasi estoppel' has been applied to certain legal bars which are 
in some respects analogous to estoppel in pais and which have the same 
practical operation as an estoppel in pais, but which nevertheless differ 
from that form of estoppel in essential particulars. Thus, it has been held 
that no concealment or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, 
no ignorance or reliance on the other, is a necessary ingredient. 
'The doctrine classified as quasi estoppel has its basis in election, 
ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of benefits; and the 
principle precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a 
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him. The doctrine 
applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a 
position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced, or of which he 
accepted a benefit.' 
Here, Steuerer was perfectly content to allow Ms. Richards to believe she owned 
the property for some thirteen years. Steuerer sat idle while a disabled woman paid real 
property taxes on the home she believed she owned, while not charging rent, due to pity. 
Steuerer was perfectly content to be pitied as man who couldn't pay rent, while allowing 
the property to deteriorate. Mr. Steuerer took not one step to assert ownership, nor 
obligation, with regard to the property in question until he learned that it was not a no rent 
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hovel, but a developable parcel of commercial land. Under these circumstances this 
Court, like the Clontz and Hamud Courts, must send away the opportunist. Mr. 
Steuerer's claim is barred by laches and equitable estoppel. 
V. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing parties in cases involving "any civil 
action to recover on ... note ... and any commercial transaction" is provided for by I.C. 
Section 12-120(3). The phrase "commercial transaction" is defined in the statute to 
embrace "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." I.C. 
Section 12-120(3); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, B.V. 148 Idaho 89, 111,218 P.3d 
1150, 1172 (2009). In that Plaintiff is seeking declaration of an equitable trust, it only 
follows that he seeks establishment of an equitable promissory note, as the claimed debt. 
Awards to defendant who successfully defend against such claims are clearly authorized 
by the statute. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009) A 
party to an action involving a commercial transaction who is the prevailing party on 
appeal is entitled to an award of fees on appeal under the statute. Grover v. Wadsworth, 
147 Idaho 60, 66, 205 P.3d 1196, 1202 (2009) 
The critical test in determining whether a civil action is for a commercial 
transaction is whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; 
it must be integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting 
to recover. Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (Idaho 2008) The 
Court found a transaction involving real estate development, to be a commercial 
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transaction. Similarly, the heart of this case deals with a real estate transaction, the end 
game of which is commercial development. 
VI. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court is to exercise free review of the issues presented. The District Court 
failed to correctly state applicable, and therefore its conclusions of law are not sustained 
by the facts. Likewise, the District Court failed to identify and analyze the applicable 
presumptions of law. Clearly, the transaction between the parties was not mutually 
agreed to be a mortgage, but exactly what the deeds in question purported to be, a 
conveyance of fee simple interest in the subject property to appellant. The law and equity 
support reversal of the District Court's Order and Judgment. 
istopher P. Simms 
Attorney for Defendant - Appellant 
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